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Abstract
Given a causal model of some domain and a particular story that has taken place in
this domain, the problem of actual causation is deciding which of the possible causes for
some effect actually caused it. One of the most influential approaches to this problem
has been developed by Halpern and Pearl in the context of structural models. In this
paper, I argue that this is actually not the best setting for studying this problem. As
an alternative, I offer the probabilistic logic programming language of CP-logic. Unlike
structural models, CP-logic incorporates the deviant/default distinction that is generally
considered an important aspect of actual causation, and it has an explicitly dynamic
semantics, which helps to formalize the stories that serve as input to an actual causation
problem.
1 Introduction
Actual causation has puzzled philosophers since at least the work by Lewis (1973).
One way of phrasing the problem is as follows: suppose we know the causal laws
that govern some domain, and that we then observe a story that takes place in this
domain; when should we now say that, in this particular story, one thing actually
caused another? Recent work by Halpern and Pearl (2005) has also garnered inter-
est in this topic in the AI community. Their account (which I will refer to as HP)
constructs a formal definition that tries to capture this intuition in the context of
structural models (Pearl 2000). To be more concrete, it defines when some random
variables ~X of the structural model having values ~x can be counted as an actual
cause for ~Y = ~y.
In previous work, I have tried to show that the knowledge representation prop-
erties of Pearl’s structural models can be improved by borrowing representations
and techniques from logic programming. In particular, Vennekens et al. (2004) in-
troduced the probabilistic logic programming language of Logic Programming with
Annotated Disjunctions, for which Riguzzi (2008; 2010) implemented SLD and SLG
based resolution algorithms. Further analysis of this language has lead to a reformu-
lation of its semantics, called CP-logic, which attempts to clarify its causal aspects
and examine its relation to Pearl’s work (Vennekens et al. 2009). A more recent
paper (Vennekens et al. 2010) showed that Pearl’s analysis of interventions and
counterfactuals in the context of structural models can be elegantly redone in the
context of CP-logic, yielding better results for a number of examples, most notably
when cyclic causalities are involved.
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The goal of this paper is to examine the notion of actual causation in the context
of CP-logic. Section 2 will start with some motivation, by explaining a few of
the differences between structural models and CP-logic, and offering some hand-
waving arguments for why CP-logic might offer a more appropriate setting for the
study of actual causation. The semantics of CP-logic is briefly recalled in Section
3. Then, Section 4 dives into the details of actual causation by discussing the HP
definition, while Section 5 gives my own account. The traditional way of testing
such a definition is to run through a number of “tricky” examples and checking
whether the obtained answers are intuitively plausible. In Section 6, I will follow
suit. Finally, Section 7 briefly comments on a naive implementation in Prolog that
can be downloaded to play with my definitions.
2 Motivation: structural models and CP-logic
A structural model is based on a set of random variables (RVs). Each RV has an
associated domain of possible values. The simplest case are Boolean RVs, which have
{t, f} as their domain, and can therefore be thought of as propositional symbols or
ground atoms. Boolean RVs suffice for typical examples of actual causation, so I
will from now on restrict attention to just these.
A structural model then consists of a set of equations X := f(~Y ), which define
the value of the RV X in terms of the RVs ~Y by a Boolean function f . The RVs that
appear in the left-hand side of such an equation are called endogenous, and the other
ones exogenous. Typically, these sets of equations are assumed to be acyclic. Their
meaning is formalized by the obvious possible world semantics: each assignment of
values to the RVs that satisfies all of the equations is a possible world. An acyclic set
of equations has the useful property that an assignment of values to the exogenous
RVs uniquely determines a single possible world.
Pearl uses structural models to represent causal relations: each equation X :=
f(~y) is taken to mean that the causes for X taking value x are all assignments
~Y = ~y for which f(~y) = x. This representation is used by Pearl to great effect,
studying interventions, counterfactuals, and of course also actual causation.
Despite its successes, however, there is something peculiar about the structural
model representation of causal relations: it does not take into account their dynamic
nature. Suppose, for instance, that you make the causal claim that dropping a glass
causes it to break. If I don’t believe you, I might challenge you to prove your claim.
How would you do this? Presumably, you would first hold out an unbroken glass.
Then, you would drop it, so that I could watch it fall, hit the floor, and break. In
other words, you would show me a transition from a state of the world in which
the glass is whole to a one in which it is broken. If you can convince me that it was
indeed your dropping the glass that initiated this transition, then you have proven
your causal claim.
What this little thought experiment shows is that the idea of a transition from
one state of the world to the next is inherently part of the way in which we inter-
pret causal statements. However, structural models have nothing to do with such
transitions. For instance, the causal claim about glasses breaking would just be
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represented by an equation Break := Drop, which determines two possible worlds:
{Break = t, Drop = t} and {Break = f , Drop = f}. In this sense, structural mod-
els make complete abstraction of the dynamic aspects of causality, until all that
remains is a static picture of how the values of different random variables can be
defined in terms of each other.
Other approaches to causality do not share this static worldview. For instance,
Shafer (1996) gives an explicitly dynamic account of causation. He represents causal
systems by means of probability trees, in which edges represent transitions between
states of the world. For example, in the following picture, the edge going from N1
to N2 represents a transition from a state in which Joe hasn’t yet taken a swing at
the ball to one in which he has and missed:
. . .

N1
Joe misses ball
0.75{{ww
ww
ww Joe hits ball
0.25 ##G
GG
GG
G
N2

N3
. . . . . .
(1)
The edge (N1, N3) represents a transition of the same state N1 to a state where Joe
has hit the ball. Together, these two edges represent a non-deterministic event1,
namely that of Joe’s taking a swing at the ball, which may result in one of these
two outcomes. The edges are labeled with the probabilities of the outcomes: the
probability of Joe’s swing missing is 0.75 and that of it hitting is 0.25.
This paper will use CP-logic as its formal language, which is essentially just a
modular, syntactic representation for such Shaferian probability trees. A theory in
CP-logic represents the causal structure of a domain by means of a set of causal
probabilistic laws (CP-laws, for short). Each such CP-law is a blue-print for a class
of non-deterministic events. For instance, the following CP-law:
∀p, b (Hit(p, b) : 0.25) ∨ (Miss(p, b) : 0.75)← Swing(p, b)
states that, for every player p and ball b, player p’s taking at swing at ball b causes
a non-deterministic event, which has as one possible outcome that p hits b (and this
happens with probability 0.25), and as its other possible outcome that p misses b
(which happens with probability 0.75).
If p and b are instantiated to, respectively, a particular player and a particular
ball, say Joe and the twelfth pitch, the we obtain a description of one particular
event (that may or may not happen, depending on whether Joe decides to swing):
(Hit(Joe, 12) : 0.25) ∨ (Miss(Joe, 12) : 0.75)← Swing(Joe, 12).
This instantiated CP-law can be seen as a textual representation of picture (1),
provided that, of course, node N1 represents a state of the domain where Joe has
1 Note that I do not use the term “event” in its probability-theoretical meaning of “a set of
possible outcomes”, but rather in the common-sense meaning of “a thing that happens”.
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decided to take a swing at this particular pitch. In this way, each instantiation of
a CP-law describes a piece of probability tree. As will be explained in more detail
later, an entire CP-theory describes a class of probability trees, each of which can
be constructed by putting these small pieces together.
Unlike structural models, the formal semantics of CP-logic therefore does provide
mathematical objects that represent transitions between states of the world. As
argued by Glymour et al. (2010), these transitions are important for a study of
actual causation. Indeed, when the goal is to figure out what caused what in a
given story, it is obviously convenient to have a language whose formal semantics
already offers objects that correspond in a natural way to stories. A branch of a
Shaferian probability tree is precisely such an object, because, like a story, it is a
description of a sequence of events that change the state of the world.
There is also a second argument in favour of CP-logic. The goal of actual causa-
tion is to explain why things happened. Typically, though, not everything is in need
of explanation. A detective solving a murder case, for instance, will be interested
in why the victim is dead, but he won’t care about why he was ever alive in the
first place. The detective’s causal model will therefore list causes for dying (poison,
gun shot, . . . ), but not for living (sexual intercourse, IVF, . . . ). In more technical
terms, the detective considers living to be the default state of a person, and he is
only interested in deviations from this default. Many authors, such as Hall (2004)
or Hitchcock (2007), have argued that actual causation should be studied under the
assumption that each RV has such a default state.
Structural models make no distinction between the different values of a RV.
Consequently, a RV Alive with values yes and no, and a RV Dead with values
no and yes are completely interchangeable. In CP-logic, this is not the case. Here,
each RV (i.e., ground atom) has f as its default value. This means that the mere
existence of the atom Alive(Adam) implies that the default condition is for Adam
to be dead, and that he can only come to life when there is a sufficient cause for
this. By contrast, the detective’s theories will contain atoms such as Dead(Adam),
indicating that living is the default and death is in need of causal explanation. In
the probability trees generated by a CP-theory, an atom always starts out at its
default value, and only deviates from this when it has sufficient cause to do so.
3 Reminder: formal semantics of CP-logic
Lacking space for a full review of CP-logic, I will only summarize the main ideas
and refer to (Vennekens et al. 2009) for details. The general form of a CP-law is:
∀~x (A1 : α1) ∨ · · · ∨ (An : αn)← φ. (2)
Here, φ is a first-order formula and the Ai are atoms, such that the tuple of variables
~x contains all free variables in φ and the Ai. The αi are non-zero probabilities with∑
αi ≤ 1. Such a CP-law expresses that φ causes some (implicit) non-deterministic
event, of which each Ai is a possible outcome with probability αi. If
∑
i αi = 1,
then at least one of the possible effects Ai must result if the event caused by φ
happens; otherwise, it is also possible that the event happens without any (visible)
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effect on the state of the world. For the purpose of this paper, the propositional
fragment of CP-logic suffices, so I will from now on restrict attention to CP-laws in
which the tuple of variables ~x is empty.
For a CP-law r, we refer to φ as the body of r, and to the sequence (Ai, αi)
n
i=1
as the head of r. We denote these objects as body(r) and head(r), respectively,
and also write headAt(r) for the set of all Ai for which there exists an αi such
that (Ai, αi) ∈ head(r). For CP-laws that are vacuously caused, body(r) may be
omitted. If a CP-law has a deterministic effect, i.e., it is of the form (A : 1)← φ, it
is also written simply as A← φ.
A CP-theory is a finite set of CP-laws. Such a CP-theory describes the non-
deterministic evolution of a domain, which is formally represented by a Shaferian
probability tree. Initially, all RVs of this domain (i.e., all ground atoms) are in their
default state. This means that we can describe the initial state of the domain, which
corresponds to the root of the probability tree, by the interpretation that assigns f
to each of them. We then extend this root by picking a CP-law r whose precondition
body(r) is satisfied according to this interpretation and creating a child node for
each pair (hi : αi) in head(r). The edge to child i is labeled with the probability
αi and the corresponding new state of the domain is constructed from the previous
state by switching hi to its deviant state t. The CP-law r has now happened, and
will not happen again.
We repeat this process of adding children to one of the leaf nodes of the current
tree, until this is no longer possible, i.e., until for all leaves l of the current tree
it is the case that all rules r that have not yet happened in l have a precondition
body(r) that is false in l. The resulting trees are called the execution models of
the CP-theory. For a node s of the tree, I denote by I(s) the interpretation that
corresponds to the state of the world at that node, and, if s is not a leaf, by E(s)
the CP-law that was used to create the children of this node.
The construction of execution models is quite non-deterministic, in the sense
that in any particular node of the tree, there can be many CP-laws that may be
used to extend it. The question is now whether each of these trees actually reflects
a sensible way in which a domain described by the CP-theory might evolve. The
answer is a qualified “yes”, and depends on precisely how we choose to interpret
negation appearing in the body of a CP-law. Consider the following example:
(Shatters : 0.9)← ¬DecidesNotToThrow(Suzy).
We could take the body of this CP-law to mean that this transition may happen
in any state where DecidesNotToThrow is still at its default state f, such as, by
definition, the initial state in which Suzy has no yet made up her mind about
throwing. Taking this view, every probability tree constructed according to the
above principles can indeed be seen as a sensible description of how the domain
might evolve. However, this is not very useful. As argued by Vennekens et al. (2009),
it is more interesting to read negation in a slightly different way, namely, as not
just saying that DecidesNotToThrow is still at its default value in the current
state, but that it can actually never deviate any more. In other words, according
to this reading, the above CP-law will only be applicable after Suzy has decided
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that she will not refuse the throw. This idea is formalized in the semantics of
CP-logic by means of a construction similar to the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct. We
use this to compute, for each state s, an overestimate U(s) ⊇ I(s) of all atoms
that can still be caused in this s. Only if an atom a does not belong to U(s), do
we then say that ¬a holds in s. If there are no loops containing double negation
(i.e., some ¬P causing Q and ¬Q causing P ), then it is the case that, in any
branch of a probability tree, each CP-law must either happen at some point, or else
become impossible. Vennekens et al. (2009) showed that there is a close connection
between the resulting semantics and the well-founded model construction for a logic
program.
Each probability tree T defines, in the obvious way, a probability distribution
πT over its leaves. For an execution model T of a CP-theory C, this distribu-
tion πT induces a probabilistic possible world semantics: the probability πT (S) of
an interpretation S is
∑
I(l)=S πT (l), where the sum is taken over leaves l of T .
Vennekens et al. (2009) showed that each execution model T of a CP-theory C de-
fines the same possible world semantics πT . For instance, the two trees shown on
page 8 are execution models of the same theory and, even though they are not
isomorphic, they both define the same πT . In this way, each CP-theory C defines
a unique probability distribution, which is denoted as πC . The probability of a
formula φ can then be defined as πC(φ) =
∑
S|=φ πC(S).
The fact that πC does not depend on the choice of any particular execution
model T may help to explain why structural models choose to ignore the dynamic
aspects of causality in the first place. Indeed, this result shows precisely that, for
applications which only care about properties of the final state that the domain
will eventually reach, the details of how this final state came about can be safely
ignored. As I attempt to show in this paper, though, actual causation is not such
an application.
Like structural models, CP-logic also makes a distinction between exogenous
and endogenous random variables. With X the set of all exogenous atoms, the
semantics of a CP-theory now becomes relative to an interpretation I for these
atoms. In particular, an execution model for C given I is defined as a execution
model that starts not from a root in which all atoms are f, but instead starts with
only the endogenous atoms being f and the exogenous atoms being interpreted
by I. Vennekens et al. (2009) have shown that for each interpretation I for the
exogenous predicates of a CP-theory C, all execution models T given I define the
same probability distribution πT , which is denoted as π
I
C .
4 Actual causation in HP
This section briefly recalls the HP account. Their paper starts with this example:
Suppose that two arsonists drop lit matches in different parts of a dry forest, and that
both cause trees to start burning, until the entire forest burns down. Both matches are
necessary to burn down the forest; with only one match, the fire would die down.
It is clear that both arsonists are an actual cause of the forest burning down. HP
reach this conclusion as follows. To represent the causal structure of the example,
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they use a structural model consisting of a single equation:
Burn :=Match1 ∧Match2. (3)
The particular story under consideration is then represented by the following as-
signment of values to the exogenous RVs: {Match1 = t,Match2 = t}. This of
course also uniquely determines the values of the endogenous RVs: Burn = t.
The HP definition is now reproduced below. In it, M is a structural model with
endogenous RVs V , ~u an assignment of values to the exogenous RVs, ~X a tuple
of endogenous RVs, and φ a Boolean formula in the RVs. The notation (M,~u) |=
[ ~X ← ~x]φ means that φ holds in (M,~u) after the intervention of assigning ~x to
~X is performed, i.e., each Xi ∈ ~X has its defining equation removed from M and
replaced by Xi := xi.
Definition 1 (HP account of actual causation)
~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ in (M,~u) if the following three conditions hold.
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) ∧ φ. (That is, both ~X = ~x and φ are true in the actual
world.)
AC2. There exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x′, ~w′)
of the variables in ( ~X, ~W ) such that if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for all Z ∈ ~Z, then
both of the following conditions hold:
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬φ. In words, changing ( ~X, ~W ) from (~x, ~w)
to (~x′, ~w′) changes φ from true to false.
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ′ ← ~w′, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]φ for all subsets ~W ′ of ~W and all
subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z. In words, setting any subset of variables in ~W to their
values in ~w′ should have no effect on φ, as long as ~X is kept at its current
value ~x, even if all the variables in an arbitrary subset of ~Z are set to their
original values in the context ~u.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2. Minimality
ensures that only those elements of the conjunction ~X = ~x that are essential
for changing φ in AC2(a) are considered part of a cause.
With ~X = (Match1), ~Z = (Match1, Burn) and φ = Burn, this definition pro-
vides the result that Match1 actually caused Fire, since if we change X to f , while
leaving ~W = (Match2) at its original value (this trivially satisfies AC2(b)), we ob-
tain ¬Burn as required by AC2(a). In other words, in this example, we get actual
causation from a simple counterfactual dependency: if it hadn’t been for Match1,
the forest wouldn’t have burned down.
HP also consider a disjunctive variant of this example, where a single match
already suffices to burn down the forest (Burn :=Match1 ∨Match2). This causes
the straightforward counterfactual criterion to fail, since stopping only one of the
arsonists does not stop the forest burning down. This motivates the additional
machinery of the above definition. By considering the context in which Match2 =
f , that is ~W = (Match2) and w
′ = (f), we can re-establish the counterfactual
dependency of Burn on ~X = (Match1).
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5 Actual causation in CP-logic
As we have seen, a question of actual causation can only be asked in the presence
of two pieces of information: a causal model of a domain (the M of Definition 1)
and a story that takes place in this domain (the ~u). My definition will of course
assume that the causal model is given in the form of a CP-theory C. In the context
of CP-logic, the most obvious formal counterpart of a “story” is a branch of an
execution model of C. Already, this allows us some more room for nuance than HP,
as the following example from Hall (2004) shows.
Suzy and Billy might each decide to throw a rock at a bottle. If Suzy does so, her rock
shatters the bottle with probability 0.9. Billy’s aim is slightly worse and he only hits with
probability 0.8.
This domain corresponds to the following set of CP-laws, where Throws(Suzy) and
Throws(Billy) are exogenous:
(Shatters : 0.9)← Throws(Suzy). (4)
(Shatters : 0.8)← Throws(Billy). (5)
Assuming that Suzy and Billy both throw, there still exist two different execution
models of the theory. Representing the states in which the bottle is broken by an
empty circle, and those in which it is still whole by a full one, they look like this:
•
0.9
Suzy hits













0.1
misses
4

44
44
44
4
◦
0.8
Billy hits













0.2
misses

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0.8
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
0.2
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4

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4
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4

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4
◦
0.9
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










0.1
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
•
0.9
Suzy hits

0.1
misses
4

44
44
44
4
◦ ◦ ◦ •
In the left execution model, Suzy’s rock reaches the bottle before Billy’s does,
whereas in the right one, it is Billy’s rock that gets there first. As discussed at the
end of Section 3, this difference is irrelevant if we are only interested in the final
outcomes that might be reached: the probability of the bottle shattering is 0.98
in both models. However, the difference becomes relevant when we want to judge
actual causation. Indeed, in the left execution model, it is possible for Suzy’s rock
to actually break the bottle even though Billy’s also would have (in particular, this
happens in the leftmost branch of the tree). According to the execution model on
the right, however, this is impossible: here, Suzy’s rock can only actually break the
bottle if Billy’s rock fails to do so.
Hall (2004) goes on to consider the following story:
Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock get there
first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s would have
shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw.
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This story tells us precisely that we are in the leftmost branch of the left execution
model above. Hence, Suzy’s rock should be the actual cause of the bottle breaking,
and not Billy’s. Before showing how I reach this conclusion in the context of CP-
logic, let me first remark that things are more difficult for the HP account. Their
paper first tries the following straightforward structural model:
Shatters := (Throws(Suzy) ∧ Accurate(Suzy)) ∨ (Throws(Billy) ∧ Accurate(Billy)).
Here, there is no such thing as one execution in which Suzy’s rock reaches the bottle
first and one in which Billy’s is first. Hall’s story therefore seems to say nothing
more than that all five RVs are t, and the phrase “Suzy’s rock gets there first”
contributes nothing. Of course, because it is precisely this phrase that determines
which rock actually broke the bottle, this causal model does not work.
HP fix the problem by introducing two new random variables:Hits(Billy) (“Billy’s
rock hits the (unbroken) bottle”) and Hits(Suzy). The order in which the two rocks
actually reach the bottle can then be encoded in the structure of the model:
Hits(Billy) := ¬Hits(Suzy) ∧ Throws(Billy) ∧ Accurate(Billy)
To me, this does not seem the right way to go. The order in which the rocks arrive is
a purely contingent matter, which belongs to the details of the particular story that
is being told, and not to the general causal structure of the domain. Saying that
Suzy’s rock arrives before Billy’s should not be placed on the same level of causal
discourse as the statement that throwing rocks at bottles causes them to break.
This is not just a matter of taste, but also has practical consequences. If we would
want to know whether Suzy’s rock would still have been the actual cause of the
bottle breaking if Billy’s rock had gotten there first, then—in the HP account—we
would not just have to look at a different story in the same domain, but we would
have to change the structure of our causal model. Such hand-tailoring of the causal
model to the question under consideration is undesirable, and, as I will now show,
it is not needed in CP-logic.
My definition too will be heavily based on the intuition of counterfactual de-
pendency from a cause C to an effect E. Therefore, I first formalize the following
criterion:
If all events happen in the way they actually happened with the exception
that C is somehow prevented from occurring, then E will no longer occur.
(*)
This requires some mathematical machinery. First, we need to be able to fix the
outcome of certain events. For a CP-law r of the form (A1 : α1)∨· · ·∨(An : αn)← φ,
we write rAi to denote the deterministic CP-law Ai ← φ. If we now have a branch
b that tells us what actually happened, then we can define as follows a theory that
fixes the outcome of all events that happened to their actual outcome.
Definition 2
Let b = (s0, . . . , sn) be a branch of an execution model of a CP-theory T . We define
T b as the union of two disjoint sets S1 and S2, where S1 contains all CP-laws from
T that did not happen in branch b, i.e., S1 = T \ {E(si) | 0 ≤ i < n}, and S2
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consists of all rA for which r caused A in b, i.e.,
S2 = {r
A | r ∈ T and for some i : E(si) = r and I(si+1) \ I(si) = {A}}.
We also need an antonymical transformation, which prevents some Ai from oc-
curring. For an r of the same form as above, we write r¬Ai for:
(A1 : α1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Ai−1 : αi−1) ∨ (Ai+1 : αi+1) ∨ · · · ∨ (An : αn)← φ.
To prevent an atom A entirely, it now suffices to apply this transformation to all
CP-laws that might cause it. Given a theory T , we therefore define T¬A as:
T¬A = {r¬A | r ∈ T and A ∈ headAt(r)} ∪ {r | r ∈ T and A 6∈ headAt(r)}.
By combining this transformation with the previous one, we can now construct a
theory (T b)¬C which corresponds precisely to the counterfactual eventuality that
everything happens precisely as it did in branch b, with the exception that C is
somehow prevented from occurring. I thus formalize the counterfactual criterion
(*), by expressing that, according to this new CP-theory (T b)¬C , E will not occur.
Definition 3
Let b = (s0, . . . , sn) be a branch of an execution model of a theory T . For two atoms
C and E, such that both C and E hold in I(sn), we say there is a counterfactual
dependency from C to E if πI
′
T ′ (E) = 0 where T
′ = (T b)¬C and, to cover the case
where C is exogenous, I ′ is I(s0) \ {C}.
Here, saying that πT ′(E) = 0 is of course equivalent to E being false in each leaf
l of each execution model of T ′.
This intuition of counterfactual dependency forms the core of the concept of
actual causation, but as discussed above, it is in itself not enough. The additional
aspect is the idea of relevance. A causal model might make provisions for a large
number of eventualities, many of which may not have been relevant in the actual
course of events. It is typical for judgments of actual causation that truly irrelevant
causal mechanisms are ignored, even when they might appear to become relevant
in a counterfactual context.
The typical case where this intuition manifests itself is when counterfactual de-
pendencies are masked by redundant causation: there is some back-up mechanism
waiting in the wings, which will ensures that the effect happens anyway, even if
we preempt its actual cause. The example of Suzy and Billy is a good illustration
of this. The reason why we nevertheless insist that Suzy is the actual cause of the
bottle shattering is precisely a criterion of relevance: because Suzy’s rock got to the
bottle first, Billy’s was irrelevant, so we ignore it.
Pearl (2000) tried to formalize this same intuition by means of the concept of a
causal beam, which is meant to encompass precisely the relevant parts of the causal
model. However, the formal details proved hard to get right, and the refinement
that eventually became part of the HP definition seems to be a significant source of
complexity, which considerably clouds the otherwise rather simple idea of counter-
factual dependency. In the explicitly dynamic context of CP-logic, something much
more simple is possible.
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Let us ask again why intuitions feels that Billy’s rock is irrelevant if Suzy’s rock
gets to the bottle first and shatters it. I suggest the blindingly obvious answer: it
just got there too late. By the time Billy’s rock reached the bottle, the damage was
already done, the bottle lay in pieces, and there was nothing left to shatter. In other
words, one simply cannot cause what is already the case. My notion of relevance will
comprise just this: whatever happened after the effect is irrelevant, and whatever
happened on the way to the effect is counted as relevant. Of course, this is not
yet a complete dichotomy, since it does not rule on the status of those events that
did not happen at all. Recall that if some CP-law does not happen in a particular
branch, this means that, somewhere along the way, its precondition must have
become impossible. Whether an event that did not happen is considered relevant
will depend on when its precondition became impossible: if this was before the effect
arose, then it is relevant, otherwise not. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 4 (Actual causation in a complete information setting)
Let b = (s0, . . . , sn) be a branch of an execution model of a theory T . Let C and
E be two atoms that both hold in the final state sn of b, i.e., {C,E} ⊆ I(sn).
C is an actual cause of E in branch b if πI
′
T ′′(E) = 0 with I
′ = I(s0) \ {C} and
T ′′ = ((T ′)b)¬C , where T ′ is constructed as follows. If j is the smallest k for which
E ∈ I(sk), then T
′ = {E(si) | 0 ≤ i < j} ∪ {r ∈ T | U(j − 1) |= ¬body(r)}. In
words, C is an actual cause of E if there is a counterfactual dependency from C
to E, according to the theory T ′ that consists of both those events that happened
before E was caused, and those events that had already become impossible by then.
It is quite easy to check whether this definition is satisfied: you look at the given
branch, find the place where E first appeared, discard all events that had not yet
happened then but still were possible, and check whether the remaining theory ex-
hibits a counterfactual dependency between C and E or not. To illustrate, consider
again the leftmost branch (s0, s1, s2) of the left execution model for the Billy and
Suzy example. The bottle breaks in node s1, i.e, Shatters ∈ I(s1)\I(s0). Therefore,
T ′ = {E(s0)} = {(Shatters : 0.9) ← Throws(Suzy)} and (T
′)b = {Shatters ←
Throws(Suzy)}. According to (T ′)b, there now is indeed a counterfactual depen-
dency from Throws(Suzy) to Shatters, so the first is an actual cause of the second.
As this example illustrates, it is important that a branch (s0, . . . , sn) of an execu-
tion model not only records the successive states I(si) of the domain, but also the
events E(si) that caused each of the state transitions.
Recall that the HP setting offers no mathematical objects that correspond to a
complete story about what happened, so their definition is always just given the
final outcome in the form of an assignment of values to the RVs. In this case, we
cannot always say with certainty whether some potential cause actually caused an
effect or not. Indeed, if we get only the final interpretation I(sn) instead of the full
branch (so, . . . , sn), then the best we can do is this:
Definition 5 (Actual causation in a partial information setting)
Let T be a CP-theory and I an interpretation for its vocabulary. Let B(I) be the
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set of all branches of all execution models of T that end in a state s for which
I(s) = I. If C actually causes E in at least one branch b ∈ B(I), we say that C is
a possible actual cause for E. If C actually causes E in all branches b ∈ B(I), we
say that C is a certain actual cause for E.
If, in the bottle breaking example, we are only told that eventually Throws(Suzy),
Throws(Billy) and Shatters all hold, we find ourselves faced with precisely the
same problem as HP’s first structural model: all that we can say is that both are
possible actual causes, but neither is a certain actual cause. This is typical for re-
dundant causation patterns, and fits well with intuition here: without knowledge
about the order in which events happened, we cannot say which of the redundant
causes actually “got there first”.
So far, we have only considered actual causation as it applies to atoms causing
atoms. Often, it is also interesting to wonder which omissions contributed to an
effect (“did the doctor’s failure to treat the patient cause his death?”) or why some
effect was in fact not caused (“did the doctor’s treatment prevent the patient’s
death?”). Extending the framework to also address such questions is easy enough:
• To extend our definition of actual causation to allow also literals ¬E to act as
effects, we need to specify when such a ¬E “happens” for the first time, such
that we may discard all later events when making counterfactual judgments
to determine what caused ¬E. The obvious cut-off point is when E no longer
belongs to the overestimate U(s).
• To also allow literals ¬C to act as causes, we need to define precisely how
we will check the counterfactual dependency in this case. To assume that ¬C
was not the case, we need to assume that C has somehow occurred, which we
can do formally by just adding a new CP-law “C ←” that always causes C.
Due to space restrictions, formal details are left to the reader.
6 Examples
There is a large literature about actual causation, with many examples, counterex-
amples, and counter-counterexamples. While e.g. Glymour et al. (2010) have ar-
gued that the importance of such small examples should not be exaggerated, it
nevertheless remains useful to check that my approach behaves sensibly for them.
Due to space restrictions, I will limit myself to those examples that most clearly
illustrate the difference between my approach and the HP account.
It is common practice in research on actual causation to formulate examples in
terms of neuron diagrams. A neuron can be in one of two states, one is the default
“off” state and the other is the deviant “on” state in which the neuron “fires” or
“is active”. Different kinds of links between two nodes define how the state of one
affects the other. For instance, in the following figure, E fires if and only if B fires,
and B fires if at least one of A or C fires.
A EB
C
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Neuron diagrams typically record not only this causal structure, but also the state
of the neurons. In the figure above, nodes that are “on” are represented by full
circles and nodes that are “off” are shown as empty circles. So, A, B and E all
fire, whereas C does not. In the language that we have developed so far, a neuron
diagram therefore places us in the partial information setting of Definition 5: we
are given a causal model of a domain together with the final state that has been
reached, but are not told precisely how this state has come about.
Hall (2007) shows a number of counterexamples to HP, and introduces an alter-
native account, which he formalizes for neuron diagrams only. One of his counterex-
amples concerns the following two diagrams:
A
B
C D
E
F
A
B
C D
E
F
In both diagrams, the edges from B to F and from F to E are blocking edges: if
B fires, then F will never fire, regardless of its other incoming edges. In the left
diagram, both A and C cause E: A causes it directly and C causes it by stopping D
from preventing E. In the right diagram, however, C also causes the very “threat”
to E that it prevents. Therefore, Hall argues, in this diagram it should not be
counted as a cause for E.
The HP account correctly handles the left diagram, but fails for the right one,
since taking ~X = {C} and ~W = {D} allows us to create the context D = t in
which there is a counterfactual dependency from C to E.
To see how my definition fares, here are the obvious CP-logic versions. In the
first, A,C and D are all exogenous, while in the second only A and C are.
E ← A ∧ ¬F. (6)
F ← D ∧ ¬B. (7)
B ← C. (8)
E ← A ∧ ¬F. (9)
F ← D ∧ ¬B. (10)
B ← C. (11)
D ← C. (12)
First, consider the left theory. Here, E can only be caused after (6) has already
happened and both (7) and (8) have become impossible. Therefore, all these CP-
laws are relevant and we end up having to check whether there is a counterfactual
dependency from C to E in the original theory. Clearly, this is the case, since no
tree that starts from a root in which the exogenous predicates D and A are t and
C is f can produce E. In the second theory, the event (12) may either happen
before E is caused or after. This means we either have to check for a counterfactual
dependency in the theory {(9), (10), (11), (12)} or in {(9), (10), (11)} . In neither
theory we find a counterfactual dependency, so C is correctly judged to certainly
not be an actual cause of E. HP’s problems with this example are caused by the fact
that, lacking an explicitly dynamic semantics, they have to resort to interventions
to eliminate irrelevant events from consideration. As an undesired side-effect, they
end up allowing the possibility that D itself is relevant for judging the impact of C
on E, but the link between C and D is not.
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The following is an example of bogus prevention (Hiddleston 2005), taken from
Hitchcock (2007).
Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison, but has a last minute change of heart and
refrains from putting it in Victim’s coffee. Bodyguard puts antidote in the coffee, which
would have neutralized the poison had there been any. Victim drinks the coffee and sur-
vives.
Here, HP, as well as others such as Hitchcock (2001), erroneously designate the
bodyguard’s unnecessary antidote as an actual cause for Victim’s survival. As I
will now show, my account handles this correctly. Since the example states that
Assassin has his ChangeOfHeart before the Antidote is administered, I will not
make these exogenous atoms, but instead include them as endogenous atoms that
are vacuously caused with some unknown (and irrelevant) probability.
(Antidote : ∗)← . (13)
(ChangeOfHeart : ∗)← . (14)
Poison← ¬ChangeOfHeart. (15)
Death← Poison ∧ ¬Antidote. (16)
The example now tells the story that first event (14) happens, which is then fol-
lowed by (13). However, as soon as (14) happens, both Poison and Death become
impossible, so (13) is considered irrelevant in the actual course of events and will
not be part of the theory in which we check for a counterfactual dependency. Hence,
preventing Antidote in this theory has no effect whatsoever upon the Victim’s sur-
vival, so it is not an actual cause of Victim’s survival (but ChangeOfHeart is).
Note that if the antidote were administered before the assassin’s change of heart,
then it would be considered relevant, but still not an actual cause of Victim’s sur-
vival because then (15) would no longer be relevant. To make the antidote an actual
cause of Victim’s survival, it would have to be administered after the assassin has
failed to have a change of heart.
7 Implementation
A prototype implementation can be downloaded from the following URL:
http://people.cs.kuleuven.be/∼joost.vennekens/actcaus/act.pl
This small program computes whether an atom is a possible/certain actual cause
for an effect in the partial information setting, or an actual cause in the complete
information setting. It was written in SWI-prolog, but should also run in Sicstus or
YAP. Currently, it only handles ground theories without disjunction in rule bodies.
In the partial information setting, this prototype performs a simple backtracking
search over all branches that might generate the given observations. Obviously,
this is not an approach that would scale well for larger examples. The goal of
this prototype, however, is just to allow interested people to experiment with my
definition, in order to see whether it corresponds to their intuition. As such, it is
not meant to handle problems larger than the examples typically considered in the
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actual causation literature. Future work may investigate better algorithms, e.g., by
means of an integration into Riguzzi’s (2010) query answering algorithm.
8 Conclusion and related work
This paper has tried to argue that the HP account of actual causation is flawed
for two reasons, both of which stem from their choice of structural models as the
formal language to express causal relations. First, structural models fail to make
the distinction between default and deviant values, which has been argued by many
authors to play a key role in a correct understanding of actual causation. Second, the
static world-view of structural models is ill-suited to handling dynamic concepts,
such as the stories that are part of the input to an actual causation problem.
Since the HP paper first appeared, it has received a great deal of attention among
researchers interested in actual causation, and many counterexample and alterna-
tive approaches have been presented. Most of these, such as Hitchcock (2007) or
Hall (2007), recognize the importance of the deviant/default distinction. The prob-
lems caused by the mismatch between the static formalism of structural equations
and the dynamic problem of actual causation have achieved less attention, even
though they are recently also pointed out by Glymour et al. (2010). Nevertheless,
also these more recent approaches still use static formalisms such as neuron dia-
grams or variants of structural models. The main point I hope to make in this paper
is that for problems that, like actual causation, require reasoning about the way in
which a domain evolves, it pays to have a language with a formal semantics that
contains mathematical objects that correspond to such evolutions.
I have tried to illustrate this by defining a notion of actual causation in the
context of CP-logic, a probabilistic logic programming language which can be seen
as a modular syntactic representation for Shaferian probability trees, which offer
precisely the kind of dynamic representation that is perfectly suited for a study
of actual causation. My definition is based on a counterfactual criterion similar to
HP’s, but is able to leverage the dynamic nature of CP-logic’s semantical objects to
come up with a very straightforward notion of relevance, namely, it only considers
as relevant those events that happened (or became impossible) before the effect first
arose. This is much simpler than the relevance criterion of HP, since I do not have
to rely on complex manipulations by means of interventions.
While lacking space for an elaborate review of examples from the literature, I
have shown that there are three examples where my definition beats HP: already
for simple examples of redundant causation, it offers a more elegant account due
to its ability to distinguish the complete and partial information settings; it is also
able to detect fake causes that simply prevent themselves from preventing the effect;
and it also handles bogus prevention. Of course, that is not to say my approach
is perfect. For instance, the railroad switch example from the HP paper cannot be
handled, because it contains a RV (Destination) whose default and deviant values
switch in the middle of the story. I am also offering a prototype implementation of
my definition, in the hope that it may help to find further examples where it does
not correspond to intuition. Feedback will be appreciated.
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